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The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was the first piece of legislation signed into law by President Barack Obama in January of 
2009.  This legislation enables an employee to sue more easily for wage discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  In this article, we examine the impact that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act has had on gender pay equity discrimination 
complaints and on how the lower courts have interpreted it since it was signed into law in January of 2009.  First, we will 
provide a brief background about the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and a description of the legislation itself.  Then 
we will examine any changes in discrimination complaints since its passage, and we will analyze how lower courts have 
interpreted the legislation. We conclude by arguing that passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act has offered little redress for 
gender wage discrimination since its passage six years ago. 
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Introduction 
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was the first piece of 
legislation signed into law under President Barack Obama in 
January of 2009.  This legislation enables an employee to sue 
more easily for wage discrimination under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.  The law makes a discriminatory 
compensation decision illegal each time it occurs, such as with 
every paycheck received, as opposed to when the 
discriminatory decision is first made.  The Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act of 2009 (Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act) was passed in 
response to a 2007 Supreme Court decision that made it more 
difficult for employees to sue their employers for 
discriminatory pay.  Opponents of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act have argued that it is not fair to sue businesses for past 
discrimination.  They feared that the number of lawsuits for pay 
discrimination would increase dramatically as a result of the 
law.  Although a great deal was written about the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act prior to and directly after its passage, 
little has been written about it since.  What effect has the law 
had on pay discrimination claims?  Have such claims increased 
dramatically since the passage of the law as critics feared? 
In this article, we examine wage discrimination complaints 
since the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, and we 
examine how the lower courts have interpreted it since it was 
signed into law in January of 2009.  First, we will provide a 
brief background about the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act and a description of the legislation itself.  Then we will 
examine any changes in the receipt of discrimination 
complaints since its passage.  Lastly, we will analyze how 
lower courts have interpreted the legislation.  We conclude that 
passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act has done little to 
redress wage discrimination, and we examine other possible 
avenues to achieve that goal. 
Background 
In order to understand Congress’s motivation in passing the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, it is helpful to understand how 
lawsuits for employment discrimination are litigated in the 
United States.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, race, 
religion, color and national origin (Civil Rights Act, 1964).  
The law requires that all claims for employment discrimination 
initiate with a charge of discrimination that must be filed with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  The 
statute of limitations for filing a charge is quite short-anywhere 
from 180 to 300 days from the date that the discriminatory act 
occurred, depending upon the state in which the claim arises.  
Failure to initiate a charge within this timeframe prevents an 
employee from pursuing the matter later. 
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The passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was prompted 
by Ledbetter’s gender discrimination suit against Goodyear 
Tire Company, which was originally filed in 1999.  Lilly 
Ledbetter was employed by Goodyear Tire Company in 
Gadson, Alabama from 1979-1998.  In 1998, Lilly Ledbetter 
received an anonymous note in her locker at Goodyear.  The 
note contained Ledbetter’s salary information in comparison to 
that of her male counterparts (Ledbetter, 2012).  Ledbetter sued 
Goodyear under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
alleging gender discrimination.  In the trial that followed, 
Ledbetter discovered that she was making less than all of her 
male colleagues, even those with less seniority and those who 
received lower performance reviews than she did.  Goodyear 
argued that Ledbetter’s salary was directly related to poor 
performance reviews rather than gender discrimination.  The 
lower court ruled in Ledbetter’s favor, but Goodyear appealed 
the decision - arguing that under Title VII, all discrimination 
complaints must be filed within 180 days of the discriminatory 
action.  Thus, only the most recent salary review was subject to 
challenge according to Goodyear.  The U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of Goodyear 
and dismissed Ledbetter’s complaint, finding no discrimination 
within the 180 day review period.  This decision was not 
consistent with other decisions in the Federal Court of Appeals, 
which had followed the precedent of the paycheck accrual rule.  
According to this rule, it is acceptable to bring forth a wage 
based discrimination claim as long as one paycheck reflecting 
the alleged discriminatory pay was received during the 180 day 
statute of limitations (Ledbetter, 2007). 
Ultimately, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.  The primary question before the Supreme Court 
was not about gender-based wage discrimination.  Rather, the 
question before the Court was whether or not Ledbetter had a 
right to sue under Title VII since she had not filed her claim 
with the EEOC within 180 days of the initial discriminatory 
act.  According to Ledbetter, that initial act occurred in 1981 
when Goodyear made a pay-setting decision by adopting a pay-
for-performance system (House of Representatives, 2007). 
In reaching its decision, the Ledbetter Court relied heavily on 
precedent established in several cases: United Airlines v. Evans, 
(1977), Delaware State College v. Ricks, (1980), Lorance v. 
AT&T, (1989), and National Railroad Passenger Corporation 
v. Morgan (2002). In each of those cases, the Court determined 
that the EEOC charging period is triggered by a discrete 
unlawful employment practice.  As the Court explained, “a new 
violation does not occur, and a new charging period does not 
commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent 
nondiscriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from 
the past discrimination.” (Ledbetter, 2007, p. 628). 
Ultimately, the Ledbetter Court was divided on the 
interpretation of the “discrete act” of discrimination.  Those in 
the majority argued that Ledbetter did not have a timely claim 
because the discrete act of discrimination--the alleged 
discriminatory pay-setting decision which led to the pay 
inequity--occurred outside of the 180-day filing period.  Those 
in the minority, however, argued that it is often impossible to 
know when the discrete act of discrimination first takes place 
since salary information is often confidential. For that reason, 
the minority argued that the discrete act of discrimination was 
renewed with the receipt of every paycheck resulting from the 
initial pay-setting decision. 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that Lilly Ledbetter did not 
have the right to sue Goodyear since she had not filed her claim 
within the 180 day statute of limitations.  Even though 
discriminatory pay had occurred within the 180 day statute of 
limitations period, the initial decision that resulted in disparate 
pay had not.  Rather, that decision had occurred much earlier in 
Ledbetter’s career. 
Voting in the majority were John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, 
Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito.  
Dissenting were Ruth Bader Ginsberg, John Paul Stevens, 
David Souter, and Stephen Breyer.  Justice Ginsberg read her 
dissenting opinion from the bench, criticizing what she called 
“a cramped interpretation of Title VII, incompatible with the 
statute’s broad remedial purpose” (Ledbetter, 2007, p. 661). 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 
The Ledbetter decision prompted the passage of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.  After the Supreme Court’s verdict was 
announced on May 29, 2007, dissatisfaction with the decision 
led Democrat Representative George Miller and several other 
members of Congress to co-sponsor a bill to prevent a similar 
occurrence from happening in the future.  Congress began 
committee hearings on June 12, 2007.  Ledbetter and other 
interested parties testified in both the House and Senate 
committee hearings.   
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act amended Title VII of the Civil 
Right Act of 1964.  According to the law, a compensation 
decision that discriminates against a person is illegal each time 
the act occurs – as with receipt of a paycheck—and not just 
when the initial pay decision is made.  This legislation 
overturned the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, as is clear from the 
statutory language.  In Section 2, the act states that the 
Ledbetter decision “undermines…statutory protections by 
unduly restricting the time period in which victims of 
discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory 
compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent 
of Congress” and “ignores the reality of wage discrimination 
and is at odds with the robust application of the civil rights laws 
that Congress intended.” (Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 2009, § 
2).   
Consequences of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
Opponents of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act claimed that 
there would be an increase in pay discrimination cases 
(Editorial, 2009; Hulse 2008; Will Fair Pay 2009).  Senator 
Mitch McConnnell of Kentucky was quoted by the New York 
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Times, saying “We think that this bill is primarily designed to 
create a massive amount of new litigation in our country” 
(Quoted in Hulse 2008).  Opponents also predicted that the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act would increase costs for 
businesses not only because of an increase in the number of 
lawsuits, but also because employers would be forced to 
maintain employee personnel files for longer time periods in 
order to protect themselves against lawsuits. 
In addition to the law’s critics, some legal scholars also opined 
that the effect of the act would be far-reaching, extending the 
statute of limitations not just for disparate pay claims, but for 
all decisions related to pay, such as promotions and demotions 
(Sorock, 2010; Sullivan, 2010). 
Although some legal analysts predicted that claims for gender-
based wage and other types of discrimination would increase 
significantly in the wake of successful passage of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, EEOC statistics do not bear that out. A 
review of the number of charges of gender-based wage 
discrimination claims filed with the EEOC from the five-year 
period of 2010-2014 shows a slight overall decline in gender-
based wage claims, with the exception of 2012. That apparent 
anomaly can be explained by the fact that in May of 2012, 
1,975 women pursued class-action claims against the Wal-Mart 
Corporation, alleging gender-based discrimination in both pay 
and promotion decisions (Hines, 2012, June 6).  The number of 
gender-based wage charges is as follows: 
Table 1:  
Gender Based Wage Claims Filed with the EEOC, FY 2010-
2014 
Year Number of Claims 
2014: 1,880 
2013: 1,963 
2012: 3,777* 
2011: 1,985 
2010: 2,073 
We also examined the number of Equal Pay Act Charges filed 
with the EEOC, including any concurrent charges with Title 
VII.  Although Equal Pay Act claims are not required to 
proceed through the EEOC, Equal Pay Act claims may - and 
often are - brought concurrently with Title VII claims for 
gender-based wage discrimination. For that reason, 
examination of concurrent Equal Pay Act charges filed with the 
EEOC is useful for determining the number of Title VII 
gender-based wage discrimination claims. 
The mean number of charges that the EEOC received from 
Fiscal Years 1997 to 2014 was 1,041.  The line in the middle of 
Figure 1 represents the mean number of charges, and the dotted 
lines above and below the mean represent one standard 
deviation from the mean.  The only years that show receipts 
higher than the mean and greater than one standard deviation 
away are in 2000, 2001, and 2002 – all before the passage of 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009.  While charge receipts 
increased slightly in 2010, it was well within one standard 
deviation of the mean, and the number of charges went back 
down in 2011.  Therefore, a cursory glance indicates that the 
EEOC has not received significantly more wage discrimination 
charges, either under Title VII or under the Equal Pay Act. 
Figure 1.  Equal Pay Act Charges 
 
According to an Institute of Management Administration 
survey in 2010, the majority of employees in the human 
resource field did not feel that the law “affected their 
organization directly” (“What Has Changed,” 2010).  Larger 
companies were the mostly likely to report that the law had 
affected their organization and reported those effects were 
primarily confined to the maintenance of records such as 
performance reviews and historic salary information. 
Lower Court Interpretations of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act 
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act amends Title VII and 
provides, in relevant part, that an "unlawful employment 
practice" occurs: (a) "when a discriminatory compensation 
decision or other practice is adopted," (b) "when an individual 
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other practice," and (c) "when an individual is affected by 
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2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (emphasis supplied).  Immediately after 
passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, legal scholars 
began debating the law’s scope and predicted that the statute’s 
language—especially the “other practices” phrase—would 
enlarge the statute of limitations for all sorts of discrimination 
claims, including failure-to-promote claims that only 
tangentially impacted compensation (Siniscalco, 2014; Sorock, 
2010; Sullivan, 2010).  In reality, lower courts have been 
reluctant to adopt such a broad reading (Jacobs, 2010). In fact, 
while there were a few early district court cases that adopted a 
more liberal reading of the statute, (for example, Gentry v.  
Jackson State University (2009) appellate courts have been 
virtually unanimous in reading the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
very narrowly to apply only to those cases in which plaintiffs 
can demonstrate evidence of unequal pay for equal work.  
Those decisions are reviewed below.  
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals was one of 
the first appellate courts to weigh in on the breadth and scope 
of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in the case of Schuler v. 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP (2010).  In 1999 and again in 
2000, Harold Schuler, then 55, was passed over for a 
partnership position at Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLC, (PWC), 
a global accounting firm with more than 20,000 employees.  
PWC offered the partnership position to a 37 year-old 
employee who became partner in 2000.  In 2001, Schuler filed 
a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that PWC failed 
to consider him for the partnership position due to age.  In 
2002, Schuler, along with another male employee, sued PWC 
for age discrimination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”).  The District Court dismissed the 
case as untimely, claiming that Schuler failed to file his 
administrative charge of discrimination within 300 days of the 
2000 partnership decision, as required by the ADEA.  In 2005, 
after the employees filed new lawsuits alleging ongoing age 
discrimination, the District Court consolidated the new claims 
with the claims in the former lawsuits, and once again 
dismissed Schuler’s claims as untimely.   
Schuler appealed, claiming that his 1999 and 2000 claims under 
the ADEA were made timely by passage of the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act of 2009.  The Circuit Court, in a case of first 
impression, rejected Schuler’s broad reading of the statute, 
stating that he misquoted the statute by arguing that “the 
decision not to promote him was an ‘other act[]…intertwined 
with a discriminatory compensation decision’ because as a 
result of that decision he received significantly less 
remuneration that he would have done as a partner” (Schuler v. 
PWC, 2010, p. 374).  Agreeing with PWC, the Court 
interpreted the statutory language “discrimination in 
compensation” to mean “paying different wages or providing 
different benefits to similarly situated employees, not 
promoting one employee but not another to a more 
remunerative position” (Schuler v. PWC, 2010, p. 374). 
Moreover, the Court noted that employees who sue for “failure 
to promote” do not have to demonstrate wage disparity, but 
merely must show that they were rejected for the promotion 
and that someone outside of the protected class filled the 
position.  Accordingly, it concluded that the decision whether 
to promote an employee to a higher paying position is not a 
“compensation decision or other practice” under the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.   
The Schuler case has been cited frequently for the proposition 
that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does not extend to failure-
to-promote cases in which there is no evidence of 
compensation discrimination.  In Noel v. The Boeing Company 
(2010), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Schuler to 
hold that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act did not preserve the 
employee’s failure-to-promote claim where there was no 
evidence that the employee suffered lower pay than his 
counterparts.  Emmanuel Noel, a black Haitian national, 
worked for Boeing as a Chinook helicopter repairman.  In May 
2002, Noel applied for an offsite assignment at Boeing’s 
Amarillo, Texas facility.  Temporary offsite assignments 
resulted in a pay grade increase.  Noel was not assigned offsite 
until November 2002, at which time he received a salary 
increase. At the same time, two white employees were also 
assigned to the Amarillo facility with similar pay grade 
increases.  After a few months, the two white employees were 
promoted again, resulting in another pay grade increase, while 
Noel remained in the lower paying position.  Noel complained 
to Boeing, yet received no response.  On March 25, 2005, he 
filed a formal charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination 
based on race and national origin against Boeing.   
On June 6, 2006, Noel filed a lawsuit against Boeing alleging 
race and national origin discrimination when it failed to assign 
him to the offsite facility in May, 2002 and when he was not 
promoted along with the other white employees in 2003.  The 
District Court granted judgment in favor of Boeing, finding that 
Noel’s claim was time-barred because he filed his EEOC 
charge more than 300 days after the decision not to promote 
him. 
Noel appealed the District Court’s decision, asserting that 
Boeing’s failure to promote him caused him to receive less pay 
than his white co-workers throughout his time at the off-site 
facility.  He argued that, under the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 
“an unlawful employment practice occurs each time an 
individual is affected by application of a discriminatory 
compensation decision.”  Accordingly, “each paycheck he 
received started the administrative clock anew” (Noel v. 
Boeing, 2010, p.  270). 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court’s holding, and found that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act did not extend to preserve claims such as Noel’s.  The 
Court reasoned that Noel’s claim was simply a failure-to-
promote claim and did not assert any claims of unequal pay for 
performance of the same job.  Relying on the reasoning in the 
Schuler case, the Court found that the plain language of the 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does not apply to failure-to-
promote claims: “Thus, the plain language of the [Fair Pay Act] 
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covers compensation decisions and not other discrete 
employment decisions. []To maintain a pay disparity claim, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘employees …were paid 
differently for performing “equal work”-work of substantially 
equal skill, effort and responsibility, under similar working 
conditions’” (Noel v. Boeing, 2010, p. 274).  The Court further 
opined that the purpose of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was 
to preserve claims for compensation decisions which are often 
cloaked in secrecy and not discovered until long after the 
administrative period has expired.  This was not the case here, 
as Noel knew in 2003 that he was not being promoted, and 
therefore his statute of limitations began to run from that 
discrete date.  To interpret the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act too 
broadly “would potentially sweep all employment decisions 
under the ‘other practice’ rubric” of the law and would have the 
effect of weakening Title VII’s administrative filing 
requirement (Noel v. Boeing, 2010, p. 275). 
In contrast to its decision in the Noel case, the Third Circuit 
found in favor of the plaintiff’s Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
claim in the case of Mary Lou Mikula v. Allegheny County of 
PA (2009).  Mary Lou Mikula was hired in March 2001 as 
grants coordinator for Allegheny County police department.  In 
2004, she sent a memo to the police superintendent requesting a 
salary increase to reflect the salary of a similarly situated male 
employee who earned approximately $7,000.00 more than she 
earned.  Mikula never received a response from anyone in the 
police department regarding her request. 
In 2006, Mikula filed a complaint with the County Human 
Resources department in which she explicitly raised her 
objection to being paid less than a comparative male employee.  
She also filed a lawsuit under the Equal Pay Act at that time.  
Finally, on April 17, 2007, she filed a charge of discrimination 
with the EEOC claiming that she was paid less than a male in 
her position would receive. Shortly thereafter, she amended her 
lawsuit to include a Title VII claim for gender discrimination 
alleging that she was paid substantially less compensation for 
equal work performed by similarly situated male employees. 
The District Court granted the County’s motion for summary 
judgment, finding that Mikula’s Title VII claim was time-
barred because she learned of the disparate pay in 2004, but 
failed to file a charge until 2007.  In the interim, Congress 
passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, and Mikula appealed 
the District Court’s decision. The Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the lower court’s ruling and held that the 
County’s failure to answer Mikula’s request for a raise in 2004 
constituted a “compensation decision and other practice” within 
the meaning of the statute.  Accordingly, Mikula’s Title VII 
claim was not time-barred as to that request. 
While the Third Circuit’s decision in Mikula may appear to be 
a more expansive reading of the statute, in reality, the Court’s 
reasoning in the case is consistent with its reasoning in the Noel 
case.  In both circumstances, the Plaintiffs asserted clear claims 
of unequal pay for equal work. A similar reading of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was reached in the more recent Tenth 
Circuit case of Almond v. Unified School District (2011).  The 
employees in Almond were informed in 2003 and 2004 that the 
district planned to eliminate their maintenance positions due to 
budgetary cuts.  In lieu of termination, the district offered to 
transfer the employees to lower paying jobs, while promising to 
pay their current salaries for a period of two years.  Plaintiffs 
agreed to the transfer, then filed charges of age discrimination 
with the EEOC in 2006, claiming that their transfer and 
demotion was a result of age discrimination. 
The District Court ruled that plaintiffs’ charges were time-
barred because, under the well-established discovery rule, 
plaintiffs had 300 days from the date of discovery of the 
adverse action to file a charge with the EEOC.  Plaintiffs 
appealed, arguing that each new paycheck that reflected the pay 
demotion renewed the statute of limitations. While their appeal 
was pending, Congress enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act.  The parties agreed to withdraw the appeal to allow the 
District Court to consider whether the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act rescued the plaintiffs’ claims. On reconsideration of the 
case, the District Court ruled that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act did not apply to the case at hand.  The Plaintiffs then filed 
the appeal to the Circuit Court, arguing that the decision to 
demote them and reduce their pay was discriminatory, and 
hence affected every paycheck thereafter. 
The Circuit Court, adopting both Noel v. Boeing and Schuler, 
narrowly read the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, stating that it 
“governs the accrual only of discrimination in compensation 
(unequal pay for equal work) claims in violation of § 623(a)(1) 
-- nothing more, nothing less” (Almond v. Unified School 
District, 2011, p. 1183).  In a thorough review of both the 
statutory language of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act as well 
as the legislative history of the act, the Court dismissed 
arguments that a broader interpretation of the statute was 
warranted based on the language of the statute that an 
"unlawful employment practice" occurs "when an individual is 
affected by application of a discriminatory compensation 
decision or other practice, including each time wages, 
benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in 
part from such a decision or other practice" (Civil Rights Act of 
1964,  § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A) (emphasis supplied). The Court 
stated: 
[I]t isn't enough for an employee to show that a 
discriminatory practice somehow affected his or her pay. 
Instead, the employee must show a discriminatory pay 
disparity between himself or herself and similarly situated 
but younger employees. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Univ. of 
Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 (11th Cir. 1991) (proof of 
"discrimination in compensation" under ADEA requires 
showing "similarly situated persons outside the protected 
age group received higher wages"); Schuler v. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 595 F.3d 370, 374-75, 389 
U.S. App. D.C. 213 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In other words, 
“discrimination in compensation” requires not just any 
effect on pay, but one of a particular kind: unequal pay for 
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equal work. (Almond v. Unified School District, 2011, p. 
1181) 
The Court ultimately found that plaintiffs’ claim failed because 
neither alleged disparity in pay—to the contrary, both 
acknowledged that they were being paid at a higher rate than 
other similarly situated employees for the first two years in the 
position, until their pay was brought in line with everyone else 
in their pay scale.  The Court’s decision in Almond was more 
recently affirmed in Daniels v. UPS (2012).  There, the Court 
again rejected a failure-to-promote claim as falling within the 
protection of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act unless the claim 
was rooted in unequal compensation for equal work: 
As we recognized in Almond, the Fair Pay Act did not 
create a “limitations revolution for any claim somehow 
touching on pay.” Examining Justice Ginsburg's dissent in 
Ledbetter, which the court found Congress followed when 
drafting and passing the Fair Pay Act, Almond concluded 
that "hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and transfer 
decisions, though often touching on pay, should and do 
accrue as soon as they are announced.’…. The argument 
Daniels advances would "potentially sweep all 
employment decisions under the 'other practice' rubric." 
Noel v. Boeing Co., 622 F.3d 266, 275 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(Daniels v. UPS, 2012, p. 631) (internal citations omitted) 
Most of the other Circuit Courts of Appeal have weighed in on 
the scope of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act as well, each 
construing the law narrowly to apply only where plaintiffs have 
demonstrated evidence of unequal pay for equal work.  (See, 
for example, Hylind v. Xerox Corp. (2012) (affirming Noel and 
Schuler and finding that lower court properly dismissed hostile 
environment claim as untimely); see also Tarmas v. Secretary 
of the Navy (2011) (finding that statute of limitations for single 
and discreet acts of discrimination are not altered by the Act); 
Groesch v. City of Springfield (2011)  (reviving police officers’ 
Title VII claims for unequal pay for similar position under the 
Act); Tillman v. Southern Wood Preserving (2010) (holding 
that Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act did not apply to discrete acts 
of discrimination such as reprimand or failure to receive pay 
increase due to performance); Miller v. Kempthorne (2009) 
(holding plaintiff’s claim timely where employer improperly 
assigned him to lower pay grade, but declaring as untimely 
claim that he was denied permanent employee status); Oniyah 
v. St. Cloud State University (2012) (finding that Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act does not change the burden of proof for 
salary discrimination under Title VII or ADEA). 
One of the most recent circuit cases to address the issue of the 
breadth of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was decided by the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Niwayama v. Texas Tech 
University (2014).  In that case, Plaintiff sued the employer for 
both denial of tenure and for pay disparity claims. Plaintiff 
argued that the decision to deny tenure had consequences for 
her compensation, and accordingly, her otherwise time-barred 
claim should be timely under the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.  
The Court rejected that argument: 
In Niwayama's view, because the Provost's decision to 
deny her tenure had consequences for her compensation, 
the Provost's decision constituted a "discriminatory 
compensation decision" under the Ledbetter Act. 
Accordingly, Niwayama argues, a new Title VII claim for 
denial of tenure accrued each time she received a paycheck 
that was affected "in whole or in part" by the Provost's 
allegedly discriminatory decision. As authority, Niwayama 
cites only to Gentry v. Jackson State University, 610 F. 
Supp. 2d 564, 567 (S.D. Miss. 2009). Niwayama 
acknowledges, however, that this district court's decision 
stands for "a minority view." 
Indeed, Niwayama's argument is contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of authority on this issue. 
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit explained that under the 
Ledbetter Act "hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and 
transfer decisions, though often touching on pay, should 
and do accrue as soon as they are announced." (Citation 
omitted). Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit held 
that the Ledbetter Act's use of "the phrase 'discrimination 
in compensation' means paying different wages or 
providing different benefits to similarly situated 
employees, not promoting one employee but not another to 
a more remunerative position." The Third Circuit also 
rejected an argument similar to Niwayama's because a 
more "expansive interpretation of 'other practice' . . . would 
potentially sweep all employment decisions under the 
'other practice' rubric" set forth in the Ledbetter Act. 
Finally, this Court in an unpublished opinion held that the 
Ledbetter Act does not apply to "discrete acts" by 
employers such as "termination, failure to promote, denial 
of transfer, and refusal to hire." (Niwayama, 2014, p. 356) 
(internal citations omitted) 
Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court had 
correctly dismissed the tenure denial claim as untimely under 
Title VII.  However, the court held that the “pay disparity claim 
falls under the Ledbetter Act and therefore is not time barred.  
The Ledbetter Act explicitly…makes each paycheck at an 
allegedly discriminatory rate a separate, discrete act of 
discrimination, effectively resetting the statute of limitations for 
filing an EEOC charge.”  (Niwayama, 2014, p. 356).  Once 
again, this reasoning is consistent with the other appellate cases 
cited above. 
Conclusion 
Since the passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009, 
little has been written about the impact the decision has had on 
subsequent court decisions and implications for human 
resource managers.  Only time will tell what impact the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act will have on litigation in employment 
discrimination cases, but so far the effects seem relatively 
small.  While it is true that employers will need to document all 
promotion and compensation decisions, many businesses were 
already doing this.  There does not appear to be a surge in Title 
VII complaints of sex discrimination pay claims with the 
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EEOC, and businesses themselves report the primary effect of 
an added administrative burden, not an increase in lawsuits. 
Lower court interpretations have limited the reach of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, and EEOC charge statistics since the 
law’s passage corroborate that conclusion, all of which 
suggests that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act did little to 
effectuate real change for women seeking redress for gender-
based compensation claims.  As Sara Lyons has suggested, 
merely extending the time in which to bring a claim for gender 
pay discrimination does nothing for those who never become 
aware of gender-based discrepancies in the first place (Lyons, 
2013).  Lyons argues that the strong societal norm of pay 
secrecy undermines any potential benefits made by the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. She concludes that real change will 
require 1) passage of the Paycheck Fairness Act (PFA), 
proposed legislation that would prohibit pay secrecy rules in 
the workplace, and 2) affirmative disclosure of salary 
information to employees.  While such an approach seems 
radical, there is some merit to the argument.  Research shows 
that the wage gap is smaller where employers promote pay 
transparency, such as in federal government and union jobs. 
According to a study conducted by the Institute for Women’s 
Policy Research, 62% of private sector female workers and 
60% of private sector male workers report that discussion of 
salary is discouraged or prohibited and could lead to 
punishment (Institute for Women’s Policy Research, 2014, 
January).  That number is dramatically lower for public sector 
workers, with only 18% of women who work in the public 
sector reporting pay secrecy rules, and only 11% of men.  Not 
surprisingly, the wage gap for the federal workforce, where pay 
transparency is very high, is only about 13%, much lower than 
the national average of about 30%. (Covert, 2014, April 14).  
Similarly, in unionized workforces where salaries are disclosed 
in a collective bargaining agreement, the wage gap for 
unionized workers is only about 9% (Covert, 2014, January 
27).  Moreover, Gowri Ramachandran has argued for the use of 
pay transparency policies as a legal affirmative defense to wage 
disparity claims, thereby further incentivizing an employer’s 
use of such policies (Ramachandran, 2012). Unfortunately, 
systemic change to pay secrecy rules face an uphill battle, as 
proponents of the Fair Pay Act can attest. 
While passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act has not 
resulted in an increase in charges of wage discrimination, it 
may have caused some employers to examine pay practices to 
avoid claims for wage discrimination (Siniscalco, Livingston, 
Cousins, Tran & Phillips, 2010). This is a modest gain at best. 
Nevertheless, until there is a cultural shift towards pay 
transparency in the workplace, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
offers an incremental legal tool in the fight for full gender-wage 
equality. 
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